Thus the problem with the sudden popularity of high-frequency trading is that it may increasingly destabilize the market. Hedge funds won’t necessarily care whether the increased volatility causes stocks to rise or fall, as long as they can get in and out quickly with a profit. But the rest of the economy will care.
via Op-Ed Contributor – Hurrying Into the Next Panic? – NYTimes.com.
“Selection therefore favors this form of overconfidence.” Winners know how to bluff. And who bluffs the best? The person who, instead of pretending to be stronger than he is, actually believes himself to be stronger than he is. According to Wrangham, self-deception reduces the chances of “behavioral leakage”; that is, of “inadvertently revealing the truth through an inappropriate behavior.” This much is in keeping with what some psychologists have been telling us for years—that it can be useful to be especially optimistic about how attractive our spouse is, or how marketable our new idea is. In the words of the social psychologist Roy Baumeister, humans have an “optimal margin of illusion.”
If you were a Wall Street C.E.O., there were two potential lessons to be drawn from the collapse of Bear Stearns. The first was that Jimmy Cayne was overconfident. The second was that Jimmy Cayne wasn’t overconfident enough. Bear Stearns did not collapse, after all, simply because it had made bad bets. Until very close to the end, the firm had a capital cushion of more than seventeen billion dollars. The problem was that when, in early 2008, Cayne and his colleagues stood up and said that Bear was a great place to be, the rest of Wall Street no longer believed them. Clients withdrew their money, and lenders withheld funding. As the run on Bear Stearns worsened, J. P. Morgan and the Fed threw the bank a lifeline—a multibillion-dollar line of credit. But confidence matters so much on Wall Street that the lifeline had the opposite of its intended effect. As Bamber writes:
Jeremy Grantham of GMO is nervous about emerging markets, especially China.
Our other perennial favorite – emerging market equities
– has had an amazing recovery, all things considered, and is no doubt also vulnerable to a reassessment of how quickly the global economy is recovering. Deciphering the strength of the Chinese economy will also play a major role in formulating our view of any future relative strength of emerging. My colleague, Edward Chancellor, strongly suspects that the Chinese economy is dangerously
unbalanced and very likely to come unhinged in the next
few quarters, surprising the pants off investors.
Reminds me that Yellen comes from the neo-Keynesian Tobin school at Yale.
Also thought that the quality of this post was pretty low and only later realized it wasn’t written by Yves.
What Janet Yellen seems to be saying is:
First, that deficits do not matter unless they are ‘structural’ and not temporary. It does not matter how much, for example, we give to the banks. When the crisis is over, the deficits will remain, but will not grow larger, and will be offset by higher taxes, that will come from the improved economy.
Secondly, that developing countries have independent central banks that know how to and are willing to fight inflation, as opposed to the central banks of undeveloped countries where the government impedes their ability to fight inflation and to monetize the debt.
Thirdly, monetary inflation only occurs where excess demand for goods and services is generated. Until that point, unless there is this demand, increased money supply does not generate inflation. We might call this the reverse Laffer, in that it is a Demand side view of inflation that tends to discount the supply side completely.
via naked capitalism: Guest Post: Janet Yellen Channels Ronald Reagan.
But the clearest signal that things are looking up for private equity is the news that the granddaddy of the industry, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), is to revive its plans to go public—and fast. These plans were postponed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers last September led to a meltdown in the financial markets. By early this year KKR’s partners were considering abandoning the IPO for good. Now, they are in a hurry to get it done. The IPO is due to take place in October, through a reverse merger of the holding company into a European unit that KKR floated in happier times. By this method, KKR gets a listing in Amsterdam at least a year before it could get one in America—though the firm says it will put in place corporate-governance measures designed to meet the high standards of the New York Stock Exchange rather than the less demanding Dutch requirements.
via Business.view: The barbarians are coming, again | The Economist.
Basically what I said yesterday (flash trading):
But it is worth distinguishing between the illegal and the irritating. Frontrunning – or trading ahead of customer orders – is the former. Successfully employing the biggest nerds and the best millisecond-saving technology is not. Markets have always been skewed against retail money, whether information sloshes around an open outcry pit or a high-tech algorithm. Now, however, cheaper technology, plus the disaggregation of traditional exchanges, means HFT is exploding.
via FT.com / Lex / Macroeconomics & markets – High frequency trading.
The broader failing of McKinsey and its acolytes at Enron is their assumption that an organization’s intelligence is simply a function of the intelligence of its employees. They believe in stars, because they don’t believe in systems. In a way, that’s understandable, because our lives are so obviously enriched by individual brilliance. Groups don’t write great novels, and a committee didn’t come up with the theory of relativity. But companies work by different rules. They don’t just create; they execute and compete and coördinate the efforts of many different people, and the organizations that are most successful at that task are the ones where the system is the star.
Firms often pay a substantial premium to the market price when making acquisitions. Does their willingness to pay a premium suggest the shares of target firms were mispriced?
EFF: The empirical evidence says that all the gains from mergers are eaten up in the premiums paid to acquire firms. On average, the acquiring firm gets nothing. This doesn’t necessarily imply that the shares of the acquired firm were mispriced since there can be synergies (real business gains) from mergers.
KRF: Takeover premiums do not imply that the target firms were mispriced. Since we do not expect the market to accurately forecast every acquisition that will create value, we should not be surprised that prices rise when tender offers and mergers are announced.
FAMA AND FRENCH ON OTHER TOPICS
via Q&A: Costs of Corporate Acquisition – Fama/French Forum.
Ha, the “subprime” of health insurance:
In his recent post on health care and insurance Paul Krugman writes:
[Insurance companies] try to avoid covering people who are actually likely to need care.
If insurance companies do avoid covering people who are “likely to need care,” this suggests that the uninsured are unhealthy. But 60% of the uninsured are in excellent health (Table 10) (In fact, overall the uninsured are only slightly less healthy than the insured).
To be sure, this doesn’t mean that being uninsured is not a problem but, contra Paul, it does mean that insurance companies would be willing to cover most of the uninsured at the same rates as the insured if the uninsured could or would pay those rates. In Paul’s story there is a market failure, in the latter story health insurance is expensive and some people don’t buy it. The difference matters because the wrong diagnosis will almost surely lead to the wrong treatment.
via Marginal Revolution: The Uninsured: Adverse Selection Problem or Distribution Problem?.
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